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Longmeyer Exposes (or Creates) Uncertainty
About the Duty to Inform Remainder
Beneficiaries of a Revocable Trust
by Turney P. Berry, Louisville, Kentucky
David M. English, Columbia, Missouri, and
Dana G. Fitzsimons, Jr., Richmond, Virginia*
Editor's Synopsis: This article discusses the surprising Longmeyer decision, handed down by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky earlierthis year in which
a predecessor trustee was held to have a duty to give
certain notifications to former remainderbeneficiaries
of a revocable trust. The authors then examine how
Longmeyer might have been decided in other states
and under other statutory schemes. The article concludes with observations concerning when certain
notices to trust beneficiaries may be conducive to
effective trust administrationand suggestions to those
who administer trusts on how best to comply with beneficiary notice requirements.
The Decision
In J. P Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Longmeyer,' a
trustee of a revoked trust, suspecting that a settlor may
have been unduly influenced, informed certain charities
that the settlor had revoked the trust under which they
had been named as beneficiaries. The charities thereupon brought an action to invalidate the revocation and
a new trust executed by the settler on grounds of undue
influence, which case was settled for a large cash payment. The trustee of the successor trust then sued the
trustee of the predecessor trust, arguing that the predecessor trustee was personally liable for the settlement
amount because the notification of the charitable beneficiaries was a breach of trust and that had the charitable
beneficiaries not been notified, no settlement payment
would have been necessary.
The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
predecessor trustee. The court not only held that the
predecessor was protected from liability for giving the
notice, but more broadly ruled that the predecessor
trustee had an affirmative duty to inform the remainder
beneficiaries of their removal. Although the opinion

does not define "living trust," the case concerned and
the court's opinion focused on the use of a revocable
trust used as a will substitute. The court's rationale was
simple and direct-the Kentucky statute requiring a
trustee to "keep the beneficiaries of the trust reasonably
informed of the trust and its administration"2 did not
provide any limitations on that duty nor, contrary to the
views of many if not the great majority of trust practitioners, any carve-out for revocable trusts.
In reaching its decision, the court recognized that
its opinion was contrary to "modern trends" in the law,
referring to various provisions of the Uniform Trust
Code, which has not yet been enacted in Kentucky.'
The relevant Kentucky statute in this case had instead
been selectively drawn from the much older trustee
notice provision of the Uniform Probate Code.4 The
Court was well-aware, although seemingly not at all
concerned, that its ruling would come as a surprise to
many and run contrary to the general understanding of
trust law and revocable trusts:
In fact, many laypersons who create
revocable living trusts as will substitutes might be shocked to learn that a
trustee has a duty to inform contingent
beneficiaries of their potential interests, given the understanding of many
settlors that so long as they are living
and competent the trust assets remain
essentially under their control and that
they may freely change their mind
about beneficiaries' interests. But if
our trust statutes are out of touch with
modem policy or with the expectations
of today's community, it is the legislature's task to amend the statutes, not
this Court's role to re-write them.'

275 S.W.3d at 701 n. 8 (discussing Unif. Prob. Code § 7-

275 S.W.3d 697 (Ky. 2009).
Ky. REV. STAT.
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275 S.W.3d at 701-02 & n. 9

303).

275 S.W.3d at 702 (footnote omitted).
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More on the Facts
Despite the sweeping statements of the court, it is
possible that other courts will choose the undeniably
sensible approach of limiting Longmeyer to its extraordinary facts. The majority opinion certainly contains
sufficient standout facts to facilitate such a limitation.
The settlor, Ollie Skonberg, was a long-time customer
of Bank One (predecessor to JP Morgan Chase Bank)
and Ms. Skonberg named Bank One as trustee of her
revocable living trust. The trust, which was drafted by
Ms. Skonberg's attorney in 1984, provided for the
income to be paid to Ms. Skonberg for her lifetime
with the remainder to go to various beneficiaries at her
death. Three years later, Ms. Skonberg amended her
trust, retaining Bank One as her trustee, and adding
certain charities as remainder beneficiaries following
her death. The court notes in its opinion that Ms.
Skonberg, a "wealthy widow known to be frugal," paid
the drafting attorney (an ACTEC Fellow and now
retired partner of one of the authors of this article) the
generous sum of $100 to revise her estate plan.
The facts surrounding the changes to Ms. Skonberg's
estate plan read like a law school hypothetical on will
contest litigation, and provide a sober look at the circumstances that will likely be faced by an aging population with a significant accumulation of wealth and
increased exposure to dementia and deterioration. In
1997 Ms. Skonberg, nearly bedridden at 93 years old,
hired John M. Longmeyer to make changes to her estate
plan at the suggestion of Vicki Smothers, Ms. Skonberg' main caregiver at the time. The new estate plan
outlined by the caregiver grossly inflated the bequest to
the caregiver from $20,000 to $500,000, appointed
Longmeyer himself as trustee of the revocable trust
replacing Bank One (and specified annual compensation of $100,000), and removed the charities as beneficiaries. The rewriting of Ms. Skonberg's estate plan was
very much a family affair for Longmeyer. The actual
draftsman of the documents was Longmeyer's son-inlaw, an out-of-state lawyer not licensed to practice law
in Kentucky. Longmeyer, his wife, and his secretary
witnessed Ms. Skonberg's revised documents. Longmeyer's brother-in-law, a physician but not Ms. Skonberg's physician, spent 45 minutes with Ms. Skonberg
at some point to assess her testamentary capacity.
After being informed of its removal as trustee and
the other changes to the trust agreement, Bank One
entered into an agreement with Longmeyer as trustee
to serve as investment agent for the trust. Bank One
did not take any other action at that time and did not
object to its removal or question the circumstances of

6
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the new documents. Six weeks after the new documents were signed, Ms. Skonberg died. About a
month after her death, Longmeyer terminated the
investment arrangement with Bank One and transferred the funds to another investment advisor. Subsequently, Bank One obtained an opinion letter [from
another ACTEC Fellow] that it had an obligation to
notify the charities that they had been removed as trust
beneficiaries and also of their status and the circumstances surrounding the Ms. Skonberg's new estate
plan. The court noted that "[o]nly when Longmeyer
terminated the investment agreement after Skonberg
died and the trust funds were moved from the bank did
Bank One give notice to the ousted beneficiaries."6
The charities as former beneficiaries filed a lawsuit alleging that Ms. Skonberg's new estate plan was
the product of undue influence. Ultimately, Longmeyer
settled with the charities on the brink of trial by paying
the charities $1,875,000. Longmeyer in turn sued
Bank One to recover the $1,875,000 paid to the charities, based on his allegation that "if Bank One had kept
quiet about the 1997 revisions, the former beneficiaries would have been unaware that they had been ousted as Skonberg's beneficiaries and would not have
brought the suit that resulted in the settlement." Longmeyer contended that Bank One breached its fiduciary
duties when it disclosed information about the trust to
the charities.
More on the Decision
The court could have issued a narrower opinion.
For instance, it could have held that Bank One was
permitted, but not obligated, to notify the charitable
beneficiaries and therefore was immune from liability
because courts will not generally interfere with the
exercise of discretion by the trustee acting within the
scope of its powers. Perhaps the court was concerned
with having to reconcile Bank One's delay and agency
agreement with Longmeyer as trustee, or preferred an
absolute rule of law that would allow the court to
avoid having to deal with difficult facts, such as the
proof or lack of proof in the trial court record concerning Ms. Skonberg's capacity. The court could also
have decided the issue on other grounds unrelated to
the duty to disclose-for example, that Longmeyer
was not "harmed" by making a voluntary settlement
payment, or that his own unclean hands were a bar to
his claims. Instead, the court concluded that the right
to notice was absolute:
One who creates a living trust, revocable or irrevocable, necessarily
involves one or more parties. There
must be a trustee and, by operation of

law, certain duties devolve upon that
trustee. There must also be beneficiaries and, at a minimum, certain expectations are created in that process. A
trust instrument differs in concept
from a will whereby one may execute
and revoke the instrument without the
involvement of others or creation of
legal duties upon others.
KRS
386.715 supports the view that, at a
minimum, trust beneficiaries have a
right to notice from the trustee.'
The most significant thing to note about this duty
imposed by the court is the failure to distinguish
between the beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust and
those of a revocable trust while the settlor is still living
and capable of revoking the trust. The court went even
further. Bank One provided two pieces of information
to the charitable beneficiaries: that they had been
removed and that Ms. Skonberg may have been subject to undue influence when she reached that decision. The opinion holds that Bank One was required
under the Kentucky statute to provide this information
also-going beyond mere notice of the existence of
the trust and its amendment. Further, the Court rejected any argument that Bank One's duties ended when it
was removed as trustee.
What of the argument that Bank One had a duty
only to Ms. Skonberg as settlor because the trust was
revocable by her? The Court rejected any such narrow
view of the trustee's duty, noting that there is no statutory duty to a settlor in Kentucky and stating that it
could find no Kentucky cases expressly recognizing
the existence of such a duty.'
The court in Longmeyer did not address whether a
settlor in the trust instrument may eliminate or reduce
the duty of the trustee to notify beneficiaries through
the trust instrument itself. Nor does the opinion discuss
what sorts of information about the operation of a trust,
if any, must be provided to the beneficiaries. The easiest reading of the opinion is that the Kentucky Supreme
Court does not distinguish between revocable trusts and
irrevocable trusts, although perhaps the unfunded revocable trust could be argued to have a different status.
The Dissent
A lone dissenter, Justice Schroeder, agreed with
the majority that a trustee has a duty to inform the beneficiaries whether the beneficiaries' interests are vest-

275 S.W.3d at 702-03.

ed or contingent. But Justice Schroeder would have
created a limited carve-out for revocable trusts.
Assuming that Ms Skonberg was competent when she
revoked the trust, then title to the trust assets would
have reverted to Ms. Skonberg, at least momentarily,
and the trustee's duty to keep the beneficiaries
informed would have run to Ms. Skonberg, since she
was now in title. On the other hand, if the Trustee
were concerned about undue influence, fraud, or some
other irregularity the trustee could have filed a suit for
instructions. Assuming that Ms. Skonberg's revocation was valid, the trustee, in notifying the charitable
beneficiaries of their removal, may have revealed confidential information, and Justice Schroeder voted to
remand the case to determine whether the trustee was
liable for such improper disclosure.
Policy Issues
While it may be difficult to digest the ease by
which the court stepped around principles of trust law
and the nature of revocable trusts, the question must be
asked-does the Longmeyer decision represent bad
policy? We are in the early stages of what has been
called the largest inter-generational transfer of wealth
in the nation's history (albeit diminished in sheer numbers due to recent economic difficulties). Much of that
wealth is in the hands of an aging population. As a
result of improvements in medical technology, the lives
of many will be extended, which will also widen the
exposure to dementia and elder abuse. The Brooke
Astor elder abuse situation in New York, although certainly unique in the amount of money at issue, is unfortunately becoming all too common. The current high
unemployment rate and severe market losses will no
doubt tempt others to try and drain resources from
aging parents and family members through abuses of
powers of attorney and positions of confidence or otherwise. We are likely to see an increasing number of
cases concerning challenges to dramatic deathbed or
post-incapacity changes to wills and trusts. In view of
this, should the policy of the law encourage or require a
trustee to alert beneficiaries, regardless of whether current, present, vested, contingent, or subject to revocation, of suspicious circumstances concerning a change
to a trust and protect them when they provide it?
There are competing policy concerns. On the one
hand is the importance of recognizing the freedom to
change a revocable trust without unnecessary hindrances
and without having to give notice to persons whose interests have not vested, in keeping with the nature of a revo-

8
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The court cried out for the Kentucky legislature
to address the issues raised in the opinion. 9 Until

such time as the legislature acts (for example,
through enacting the Uniform Trust Code with provisions concerning disclosure that closely follow
the UTC), clients who want to create funded revocable trusts without creating a duty in the trustee of
notification have few options. One approach would
be to create a non-Kentucky trust or at least to opt
out of Kentucky law governing administrative
aspects of the trust if a Kentucky trustee is used.
A second approach would be an admittedly odd
estate plan in which a funded revocable trust is created that requires distribution at death to the settlor's
estate, subject, however, to the settlor's testamentary
power of appointment. By will, the settlor appoints
the assets of the funded revocable trust to a new trust
that has been unfunded until death and over which
the settlor is trustee until death. Suppose settlor
decides to remove Beneficiary Fred from her estate
plan and thus amends the unfunded revocable trust to
do so. She does not tell Fred. May Fred sue the settlor's estate for breach of the duty? In principle,
under Longmeyer the answer would be yes but presumably any damages would be minimal or nonexistent. Of course, if the changes occurred when the settlor was of questionable competence Fred would
have all of his usual rights.
A third approach would be to rely on a Kentucky
statute insulating corporate fiduciaries from liability
when following the direction of the grantor or advisors if provided in the instrument. Unfortunately,
the statute applies only to limit the liability of corporate fiduciaries and not individuals. If a corporate
fiduciary is trustee of a trust that allows notice to be
given to beneficiaries only at the direction or with
the consent of the settlor or imposes an advisory
committee to direct the trustee on such matters, then
this statute by its terms insulates the corporate fiduciary from liability."o

275 S.W.3d at 702.
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 286.3-275 provides as follows:
(1) When an instrument, under which a bank empowered to
act as a fiduciary or trust company acts, reserves in the
grantor, or vests in an advisory or investment committee or
in one (1) or more other persons, any power, including, but
not limited to, the authority to direct the acquisition, disposition, or retention of any investment or the power to authorize any act that the bank or trust company may propose,
the fiduciary is not liable, either individually or as a fiduciary, for either of the following:
(a) Any loss that results from compliance with an
authorized direction of the grantor, committee, person, or
persons; or
(b) Any loss that results from a failure to take any

action proposed by the bank or trust company that requires
the prior authorization of the grantor, committee, person, or
persons if the bank or trust company timely sought but
failed to obtain that authorization.
(2) The bank or trust company referred to in subsection
(1) of this section is relieved from any obligation to perform investment reviews and make recommendations with
respect to any investments to the extent the grantor, an advisory or investment committee, or one (1) or more other persons have authority to direct the acquisition, disposition, or
retention of any investment.
(3) This section shall not apply to the extent that the
instrument, under which the bank or trust company referred
to in subsection (1) of this section acts, contains provisions
that are inconsistent with this section.

cable trust as a will substitute. On the other hand is the
risk of abuse and the argument that, while an inconvenience or a nuisance in ordinary circumstances, in the
abusive situation the expanded notice obligation can help
expose bad actors earlier before assets are improperly
taken and squandered or put beyond the practical reach
of judgments and the court's enforcement powers.
Regardless of how one views the policy debate, it
is worthwhile to consider an alternative approach that
might have been taken by Bank One in this case and
which Justice Schroeder suggested in his dissent. A
trustee presented with a doubtful or uncertain situation, including the validity of a trust instrument
purporting to remove the trustee, could seek the aid
and direction of the court. A petition for instructions
would have required notice to the charities as well as
Longmeyer, and arguably would have brought the
issues and the parties before the court in a way that
was less risky for the corporate trustee. Also, it could
have avoided turning assets over to a potential bad
actor while the court sorted through everything. While
the litigation would have no doubt been messy, it
would be difficult for any court to find fault in the
trustee and by the nature of the proceedings the trustee
would not have taken a position in favor of the charities or Longmeyer. Because Ms. Skonberg died mere
weeks after the revocation and new trust were signed,
a petition for instructions in this case would have been
short-lived and would have been replaced quickly with
the traditional will and trust contest litigation. However, if Ms. Skonberg had lived longer, a petition for
instructions would have insulated her assets for her
benefit while the court sorted through the situation.
Implications for Kentucky Practitioners
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Implications for Other States
The Kentucky statute at issue in Longmeyer was
copied from Section 7-303 of the Uniform Probate Code,
approved by the Uniform Law Commission in 1969.
Although Section 7-303 was at one time enacted in twenty or so states, this number is rapidly declining as states
enact the Uniform Trust Code, which has very different
provisions. There are also a sizeable number of states
that have enacted neither uniform act or have enacted
other statutory provisions. Without attempting a complete 50-state survey, this article will address the implications of Longmeyer for the UPC states, the UTC states,
and what will be referred to here as the common law
states. Also discussed is an interesting Delaware statute.
The implications of Longmeyer are greatest for the UPC
states, less significant for the UTC states, and, like so
many other issues of trust law, less certain for states still
relying on the common law. The article then concludes
with practice suggestions relevant to all states.
Common Law States
Despite its considerable importance to trustees,
beneficiaries, and their counsel, the trustee's obligation to disclose information to beneficiaries was not
well-defined at common law. There is so little actual
case law, that resort is usually made to the Restatement of Trusts when attempting to describe the common law, which will largely be the case here. Furthermore, such law review articles as exist on the trustee's
duty to disclose are all recent."
Pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Trusts,
which was approved in 1957 and published in 1959, a
trustee must give the beneficiary complete and accurate
information about the trust assets, provided the information is both requested by the beneficiary and the
requests are made at reasonable times. 2 The beneficiary also has the right, upon request and at reasonable
times, to inspect or have his agent or accountant inspect
the trust records." Although the trust terms may
attempt to set the parameters of the information to be
provided and its frequency, at common law the trust
terms could not eliminate the beneficiary's right to the
" See T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee's Duty to Infonn, 85 N.C. L.
REV. 1595 (2007); Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive
Quest for Unifornity in the Law of Trusts, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713
(2006); Kevin D. Millard, The Trustee's Duty to Infonn and Report
Under the Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 373
(2005).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 (1959). The "reasonable time" requirement, perhaps implicit in Restatement (Second) is made explicit in Restatement (Third). See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 cmt. e (2007).

information reasonably necessary to enforce the beneficiary's rights or prevent or redress a breach of trust. 4
The Restatement (Second) and such case law as exists
does not generally distinguish between classes of beneficiaries, current or future, vested or contingent, and so
these rights to information arguably extend to all beneficiaries however their interest is described. Under the
more recent Restatement (Third), the trustee's duty to
disclose runs to a "representative" group of beneficiaries, with the group of representatives varying depending on the issue to be considered."
Even in the absence of a request, there are circumstances where the trustee has an affirmative duty to provide information to the beneficiaries. Where the trustee
is engaged in any transaction with a beneficiary concerning the trust (or if the trustee is "dealing on his own
account"), the trustee has as part of the duty of loyalty
an affirmative obligation to communicate to the beneficiary all material facts the trustee knows or should
known in connection with the transaction.'" Also, the
trustee has an affirmative duty, without request, to provide the beneficiary with the material facts affecting the
beneficiary's interest in the trust that the trustee knows
the beneficiary does not know and that the beneficiary
needs to know for his protection in dealing with third
parties with respect to his trust interest." The Restatement (Third) adds some affirmative disclosure requirements to the "representative" beneficiaries, including
disclosure of the trust's existence, of their status as beneficiaries and their right to obtain further information,
and, most significantly for purposes of the Longmeyer
facts, of changes in beneficiary status.
In addition to these general disclosure obligations,
the trustee is also required to provide accountings to
the beneficiaries when ordered to do so by the appropriate court on motion of a beneficiary. 9 Both current
and future beneficiaries, either vested or contingent,
may move to compel an accounting.2 0 The trust terms
may authorize the trustee to account to one beneficiary,
and have the approval of that designated person discharge the trustee from liability provided that person
acts in good faith and the trustee bas made adequate
disclosure of relevant facts.2' The Restatement (Third)
of Trusts clarifies that the beneficiaries are entitled to

1

Id.

RESTATEMENT
RESTATEMENT
16RESTATEMENT
'" RESTATEMENT
11RESTATEMENT
'1 RESTATEMENT
4

'1

(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. c (1959).
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 cmt. a(1) (2007).
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959).
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959).
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 (2007).
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 172 cmt. c (1959).

20

Id.

21

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 172 cmt. d (1959).
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the accounting (or a less formal but comparable report)
on request, and not only on motion to a court.22 The
Restatement Third also clarifies that the terms of the
trust may provide that one or more designated beneficiaries may receive accountings or reports on behalf of
other beneficiaries but that the designated beneficiary's
approval is subject to court review for possible abuse
even if the trust purports to preclude court review. 23
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts also addresses
issues not addressed in Restatement (Second) that are
pertinent to Longmeyer. While the trust is revocable
by the settlor and the settlor has capacity, the trustee's
duties with respect to reporting trust information and
accounting are owed only to the settlor.24 During that
time, the trustee is not to provide reports, accountings,
or other information concerning the trust to presumptive remainder of contingent beneficiaries or third parties without the express consent of the settlor, either
through the trust terms or a direction.2 ' These principles are derived from the notion that where a trust is
revocable, the interests of all beneficiaries are subject
to the settlor's power to revoke (the principle that was
sidestepped by the majority in Longmeyer).
Applying these principles to the facts in Longmeyer,
the issue of whether the trustee had a duty to inform
the removed remainder beneficiaries of their removal
would appear to turn on the question of the settlor's
capacity. Assuming Ms. Skonberg had capacity, the
trustee's duty to disclose ran only to the settlor. However, if Ms. Skonberg did not have capacity, then the
trustee would appear to have an obligation to disclose.
Unfortunately, since the issue of Ms. Skonberg's
capacity appears to have been a key issue in the case,
the trustee is left in a difficult position. The simplistic
decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court at least provides more certainty.
Restatements are advisory. Courts are free to
reject any and all principles. The issue of disclosure to
beneficiaries of revocable trusts is dealt with in detail
only in the recent Restatement (Third), and not the
Restatement (Second). Whether the Restatement
(Third) is now the law in particular states will not be
definitively determined until a local court confirms
that it is now the law. The court may of course decide
instead to follow particular cases in other states.
Unfortunately, case law to date is not particularly
helpful. The efforts to determine New York law on the
topic are illustrative. In In re Trust of Malasky26 (New

2

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS

1

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS

" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
2

6
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York case) the court refused to allow presumptive
remainder beneficiaries to challenge accountings for a
revocable trust for any years where the settlor was living and capable of revoking the trust. However, in
Siegel v. Novak27 (Florida case but decided under New
York law), the court allowed presumptive remainder
beneficiaries of a revocable trust to sue a corporate cotrustee concerning withdrawals while the settlor was
alive.
UTC States
The Uniform Trust Code ("UTC"), which was
approved in 2000, is a codification of trust law drafted
by the Uniform Law Commission ("ULC"). The goal
of the UTC is to make trust law more uniform across
the country. The UTC, with state specific variations,
has been enacted in twenty-three states. All enacted
versions of the UTC include provisions concerning
trustee disclosure.
The UTC bears some similarity to the Restatement
(Third), although on issues of trustee disclosure, the
UTC came first. The comments to Section 105 of the
UTC summarize the heated policy debate over the issue
of trustee disclosure, although the big debate was over
the extent to which a settlor should be able to waive otherwise required disclosure, less so over the basic
requirements absent a contrary provision in the instrument. On one side of the debate are concerns that
increased access to trust information will have a
depressing effect on the productivity of younger generations or encourage meddling. On the other side are concerns about the ability to redress breaches of trust, prudent and open administration, and the ability of a trustee
to start statutes of limitation on surcharge claims.28
In order to understand the application of the UTC
disclosure provisions, it is necessary to understand a
handful of concepts used throughout the UTC. A
small number of UTC provisions are "mandatory,"
meaning that they apply regardless of the terms of the
trust. These mandatory provisions are specified in
Section 105. Trustee disclosure is mentioned on the
list, although these provisions are placed in brackets,
indicating that the Commissioners expect state variation, which has in fact occurred. The remainder of the
UTC provisions are "default" rules that apply only
where there is no contrary provision in the trust terms.
The default provisions for trustee disclosure are locat-

920 So. 2d 89, Fla. Ct. App., 4th Dist. (20060
1 The policy arguments are crisply summarized in Joseph
Kartiganer & Raymond H. Young, The UTC: Help for Beneficiaries and Their Attorneys, PROB. & PROP., Mar./April 2003 18, 20
27

ed in Section 813, although for revocable trusts, Section 603 is also relevant. The concept of the "qualified
beneficiary" is also important because most of the
UTC disclosure duties run only to qualified beneficiaries, rather than to all beneficiaries. A qualified beneficiary generally includes current beneficiaries, successor current beneficiaries (where the interest of the
current beneficiaries terminates but the trust continues), and presumptive remainder beneficiaries upon
trust termination. Contingent remainder beneficiaries
who are not also presumptive remainder beneficiaries
are excluded.29 Finally, the UTC allows for the providing of notice to a representative for a minor, unborn,
and certain other beneficiaries. 30
Section 813 sets forth seven duties with respect to
trustee disclosure. The trustee must keep the qualified
beneficiaries reasonably informed about the administration, and the material facts necessary for them to
protect their interests. The trustee must promptly
respond to reasonable requests for information by any
beneficiary. The trustee must, upon request, provide
any beneficiary with a copy of the entire trust instrument. The trustee must, within 60 days of accepting
the trusteeship, notify the qualified beneficiaries of the
appointment and provide contact information. Within
60 days of learning of the creation of an irrevocable
trust, or that a revocable trust has become irrevocable
(i.e. the settlor has died), the trustee must notify the
qualified beneficiaries of the existence of the trust, the
identity of all settlors, the right to request a copy of the
trust, and the right to receive trustee's reports under
the UTC. The trustee must notify the qualified beneficiaries of any change in the trustee's compensation.
Finally, in a major change for some states but consistent with the prior law in many states, the trustee must
send to current beneficiaries, and upon request to any
other beneficiary, at least annually and at the trust termination a report of the trust assets and financial activity (i.e., receipts, disbursements, etc.), and the trustee's
compensation. Beneficiaries may waive their rights to
any UTC disclosures and withdraw previous waivers.
Settlor waiver is dealt with in Section 105(b)(8)
and (b)(9). Under the pure UTC, not waiveable is the
duty to notify qualified beneficiaries of an irrevocable
trust who have attained the age of 25 years of the existence of the trust, of the identity of the trustee, and of
the right to request trustee's reports. Also not waiveable under the pure UTC is the duty to respond to the

- UTC § 103(13).
- UTC § 301.
" Florida, Maine, Nebraska, New Mexico.
32 District of Columbia, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon.
1
Alabama.

request of a qualified beneficiary of an irrevocable trust
for trustee's reports and other information reasonably
related to the trust's administration. Recognizing that
states were taking a diversity of approaches on the
issues of settlor waiver, the Commissioners placed
105(b)(8) and (b)(9) in brackets in 2004, making their
enactment optional. At least five trends have emerged:
* Enact Section 105(b)(8) and (b)(9) in its original form or with minor tweaks;."
* Retain (b)(8) and (b)(9) but to then add language providing that a settlor may designate a
surrogate to receive notice or request information on behalf of a beneficiary;."
* Allow a settlor to totally waive notice but not
the obligation to respond to a beneficiary's
request for information."
* Delete both (b)(8) and (b)(9) in their entirety,
thereby presumably allowing a settlor to dispense with all information reporting to beneficiaries, whether mandatory or in response to a
beneficiary request;34 and
* Regardless of which one of the other
approaches the state may have adopted, make
the UTC disclosure provisions prospective
only."
With respect to the issues raised in Longmeyer,
UTC Section 603(a) adopts the rule, later also adopted
in Restatement (Third), 36 that while a trust is revocable
and the settlor has capacity, the duties of the trustee
are owed exclusively to the settlor. For a state that has
adopted Section 603(a), applying the UTC to the
Longmeyer facts raises similar issues as in trying to
apply the Restatement (Third). If the settlor has
capacity, the trustee is prohibited from giving notice to
the remainder beneficiaries. But if the settlor has lost
capacity, the duties specified in Section 813 would
kick in. Why Section 813 doesn't expressly mention
change of beneficiaries as being a material fact, a beneficiary whose interest is being sought to be eliminated would doubtless regard that as a most material of
facts and would expect disclosure.
Section 603(a), however, does have one significant difference than from the Restatement (Third).
Recognizing that states were taking a diversity of
approaches on the question, the word "capacity" was
placed in brackets, meaning that states are free, if they
wish, to enact Section 603(a) to provide that the
trustee's duties are owed exclusively to the settlor

I Arkansas, Kansas, New Hampshire, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming.
1 Arkansas, Missouri.
36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74 cmt. e (2007).
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regardless of the settlor's capacity. States deleting the
capacity test have done so in part because of the difficult issues raised in trying to apply the UTC disclosure
requirements to a settlor of uncertain capacity. Another argument is that since a revocable trust is used primarily as a substitute for a will, the rules ought to be
the same. Since disclosure of a will is generally not
required while the testator is alive, than neither should
the existence of the revocable trust while the settlor is
living. About half of the UTC states have deleted the
capacity limit. 7 In those states, the trustee in Longmeyer would have been prohibited from contacting the
remainder beneficiaries, although one wonders how
enforceable such a restriction would be if the trustee
has well-founded concerns of undue influence, which
appears to have been the case. Missouri enacted a
middle alternative. While it retains the capacity limit
it provides a procedure for determining capacity,
derived from its guardianship and conservatorship
law." If the procedure has not been implemented, the
settlor is presumed to have capacity and all duties of
the trustee continue to be owed exclusively to the settlor. Section 603 is not a mandatory provision, and
may be freely rewritten by the settlor.
California is not a UTC state but it has a provision
in its Trust Law comparable to Section 603. California
provides that a trustee need not account or report during any period while the trust is revocable.39 California
also provides that the settlor, and not the beneficiary,
has the rights otherwise afforded beneficiaries under
the Trust Law.4 o Presumably, had a California court
been presented with the Longmeyer facts, it would have
started from the assumption that the remainder beneficiaries were not entitled to disclosure.

UPC States
Although Kentucky is not a UPC state generally,
the statutory provision in Longmeyer was copied verbatim from Section 7-303 of the Uniform Probate
Code. Article 7 of the UPC was a mini-trust statute,
dealing with only a handful of trust issues, one of
which was trustee disclosure. Section 7-303 of the
UPC provides that a trustee must keep the beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed of the trust and its
administration. Section 7-303 also requires that the
trustee must inform the current beneficiaries and if
possible, one of more remainder beneficiaries, of the
trust's existence, upon a beneficiary's reasonable

" Alabama, Arkansas, D.C., Florida, Maine, Nebraska, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.6-603.
* CAL. PROB. CODE § 16064.
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request, provide a beneficiary with a copy of the portions of the trust that describe or affect the beneficiary's interest (UTC Section 813 provides that the
trustee, upon request, must provide the beneficiary
with a copy of the complete trust instrument), and
must provide the beneficiary, upon reasonable request,
with a statement of accounts annually and upon termination of the trust or change of trustee.
The UPC has been enacted in about twenty states.
However, not all of these states enacted Article 7, and
those that did are repealing it upon enactment of the
UTC. There are also states, such as Kentucky, that
enacted portions of Article 7 but did not otherwise
enact the UPC. Had Kentucky enacted the full UPC,
Longmeyer might have been decided very differently.
Another provision of the UPC relevant to the issue of
trustee disclosure is Section 1-108, which provides
that the holder of a general power of appointment,
including one in the form of a power of amendment or
revocation, are deemed to act for beneficiaries whose
interests are subject to the power. This statute was
applied in Montrone v. Valley Bank & Trust Co.,4 to
deny a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust a
request for information concerning the trust. In
42
Williams v. Northern Trust Bank of Florida/Sarasota,
the court granted the beneficiary's request but in that
particular case the beneficiary was also a current beneficiary of the trust. Had Kentucky also enacted Section 1-108, the result would appear to be comparable
to the result under the UTC. If Ms. Skonberg had
capacity to revoke the trust, there would have been no
application to inform the beneficiaries. However if
Ms. Skonberg did not have capacity, the trustee, pursuant to Section 7-303, would have been obligated to
inform at least one of the remainder beneficiaries of
the revocation.
Delaware Approach
Delaware, in an apparent response to the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in McNeil v. McNeil, has
refined its trust statutes to ensure the power of a settlor
to control and shape the duties of the trustee.43 McNeil
illustrates how the duty to treat the beneficiaries equitably may be forcefully applied in the context of the
duty to disclose. In 1959, Mr. McNeil established five
trusts from the sale of his pharmaceutical company.
Four of the trusts (the "Sibling Trusts") were for the
separate benefit of each Mr. McNeil's four children.

' CAL. PROB. CODE § 15800.
4 875 P. 2d 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
819 F.Supp. 2d 1042 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
' McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503 (2002).

The fifth trust was for the benefit of his wife, Lois (the
"Lois Trust"). The Lois Trust provide for current discretionary distributions among Mr. McNeil descendants, their spouses, and his wife. All four trustees of
the Lois Trust (three individual trustees and a corporate trustee) were aware that all of Mr. McNeil's
descendants were current permissible distributees of
the Lois Trust. Mr. McNeil's son, Hank, became
estranged from his parents and siblings, and was shortchanged under his parents' wills.
Hank sued the trustees of his separate trust for
additional discretionary distributions, and that lawsuit
was resolved in a separate suit. Hank then sued the
trustees of the Lois Trust on the basis that he was misled about his status as a current beneficiary. The trial
court found that the trustees of the Lois Trust continued Hank's "outside status," while Hank's siblings
were made aware of information about the administration of the Lois Trust (largely through their participation in a family holding company). The trial court also
found that the trustees resisted Hank's efforts to learn
information about the Lois Trust, and that the trustees
breached their fiduciary duty by failing to inform
Hank about his status as a current beneficiary and
favoring the other siblings.
The trial court ordered a 7.5 percent makeup distribution to Hank and his children, removed one of the
trustees, and surcharged each of the trustees one-fifth
of their commissions from 1987 to 1996. On appeal,
the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed most of the trial
court's decision. The Supreme Court held that (1) Mr.
McNeil did not expressly relieve the trustees of the
duty to disclose information, (2) Hank's attempts to
obtain information should have put the trustees on
notice that he did not know he was a current beneficiary of the Lois Trust, (3) a trustee has a duty to inform
beneficiaries of essential facts, and (4) the status as a
current beneficiary is an essential fact, and the trustees
wrongfully denied Hank information, and even misled
Hank about his status as a beneficiary, whilst providing
information with the other siblings (through the family
holding company). The Supreme Court also held that
large distributions to Hank from his other trust is not a
defense to the blatant failure to failure to inform Hank
about his status as a beneficiary of the Lois Trust.
In an apparent response to McNeil, Delaware now
has a statute that provides that notwithstanding any
other provision of statutory or common law, the terms
of a trust governing instrument may expand, restrict,

eliminate or otherwise vary the rights and interests of
beneficiaries, and specifically including the right to be
informed of the beneficiary's interest in the trust for a
period of time.' To emphasize the goal of the statute,
the statute also provides that the rule that statutes in
derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed does not apply to the section, and it is the policy
of the section to give maximum effect to the principle
of freedom of disposition and to the enforceability of
governing instruments. The statute does not allow the
trust terms to excuse willful misconduct by a trustee.

' 12 Del. C. section 3309(a).
" See, e.g., UTC Sec. 107(1) ("The meaning and effect of the
terms of the trust are determined by.. the law of the jurisdiction

designated in the terms unless the designation is contrary to a
strong public policy of the jurisdiction having the most significant
relationship to the matter at issue").

Practice Suggestions from the Perspective
of the Estate Planning Lawyer
As noted earlier in the suggestions for Kentucky
practitioners, practice suggestions for the instrument
drafter fall into three categories. First, an attempt to
incorporate notice provisions that the client desires
could be made by including a choice of law provision
in the trust document. This objective could be accomplished most effectively by choosing a trustee in a
state with desirable law and providing that the law of
that state governs the administration of the trust. Less
desirable is naming a trustee in a state with unclear or
"bad" law on the issue of trustee notice, and then providing that administration will be governed by the law
of a state with "good" law. There is doubt whether
such a designation could be enforced. While a drafter
is normally free to specify any law the drafter wishes,
such provisions are unenforceable if they implicate
significant issues of public policy in the forum state.45
Second, in UTC states, settlors of revocable trusts
are free to limit otherwise required notices. As noted
above, in about half the UTC states all notice provisions are waiveable. Even in states that make some
notice provisions mandatory, Section 105, which lists
the mandatory duties, applies only to irrevocable
trusts. Section 603, relating to the duties of a trustee in
the case of a revocable trust, is a waiveable provision.
The results are less certain in UPC and common
law states. The extent to which an otherwise required
notice can be waived under UPC Section 7-303, the
provision at issue in Longmeyer, has never been
pinned down. For common law states, the waiver
standard of Restatement (Second) of Trusts may still
be quite relevant. Although the trust terms may
attempt to set the parameters of the information to be
provided and its frequency, pursuant to Restatement
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(Second), the trust terms could not eliminate the beneficiary's right to the information reasonably necessary
to enforce the beneficiary's rights or prevent or redress
a breach of trust.4 6 Had they not received notice, the
charities in Longmeyer may never have known that
their interests had been eliminated pursuant to alleged
undue influence. Protecting their rights to information
would therefore appear essential for them to be able to
enforce their rights.
On a more sophisticated level, in states that recognize that advisory committees can be granted broad
authority and act in a beneficiary's stead, a provision
limiting notice to beneficiaries may perhaps have a
greater chance of success. But the issue then becomes
the potential liability of the advisors. Traditionally,
advisors are presumptively held to fiduciary standards.47 The extent to which an advisor's fiduciary
duties are equivalent to those of a trustee is uncertain
but a court could conceivably apply the same notification rules. In McNeil, the role ascribed to certain
trustees would be analogous to that of advisors in
many other situations.
Finally, an attempt could be made to limit the
potential beneficiaries to be notified. In the revocable
trust context that could be done most effectively by creating a trust with the settlor's estate as the sole remainder beneficiary, subject to a general power of appointment in the settlor which the settlor exercises by Will.
Here, however, care must be taken that the trust not be
destroyed or never created under the doctrine of merger.48 Thus, during the settlor's lifetime there would be
no other beneficiaries to be notified. But this procedure would be cumbersome. As a matter of routine the
settlor would execute the revocable trust and then execute a Will containing an "activation" clause. But it
might be difficult for a court to read the two together
because the Will does not speak until the time of death.
That the holding in Longmeyer may be so easily
avoided suggests its weakness.
Practice Suggestions from the Perspective
of the Fiduciary
Surcharge litigation is increasing, making it
increasingly important that trustees identify and manage all aspects of their fiduciary risk-including that
risk that either arises directly or is affected by the
trustee's disclosure obligations. The risk of a surcharge
action is increased where the trustee is not aware of or
does not fully understand the scope of the trustee's

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

UTC Sec. 808(d);
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fiduciary obligations. The scope of the trustee's disclosure obligations will be defined by the terms of the
governing instrument and applicable law, making a
thorough examination of both an important task for the
trustee. Attempts to provide uniformity to state laws
concerning the duty to disclose have been only partially successful, increasing the burden on trustees
attempting to define the scope of their obligations with
respect to disclosure of information and uniquely
adding to the burden of corporate trustees administering trusts in multiple jurisdictions and facing financial
pressure to standardize practices and reduce operating
costs. Longmeyer now complicates that task even further, especially in states that still have the UPC, rather
than the more thorough codification of the UTC.
Fiduciary risk should be evaluated prior to accepting the appointment, and throughout the administration, especially where a significant transaction or distribution is contemplated. As part of the evaluation of
fiduciary risk, the trustee must understand and define
the scope of the trustee's duty to disclose information
to the beneficiaries. The trustee should also be mindful of common sense and well established practices for
managing potential risks, which traditionally has
included communicating with beneficiaries.
Trustee disclosure relates directly to all of the
trustee's duties and the trustee's fiduciary risk. Generally speaking, a trustee who acts in good faith in carrying out his fiduciary duties will not be liable to the
beneficiaries for losses to the trust. Historically, open
disclosure of information to beneficiaries has been
viewed as indicia of a trustee acting in good faith. Conversely, a trustee who acts secretly may be viewed as
acting in bad faith. Because of this connection, trusts
that restrict a trustee from disclosing information to beneficiaries may expose the trustees to increased risk of a
surcharge action. Also, depending on state law, disclosure of information may commence the running of the
statute of limitations on a surcharge action against the
trustee. Trusts that restrict a trustee from disclosing
information to beneficiaries increase the exposure of the
trustee by preventing the trustee from using communication with beneficiaries to avoid litigation, denying the
trustee the full access to defenses to liability based on
good faith, and preventing the trustee from starting the
running of statutes of limitation on surcharge actions.
A trust agreement that restricts a trustee's ability to
disclose information may also prevent the trustee from
taking advantage of risk management tools under the
Uniform Trust Code (where enacted), which include

185 (1959).
" On the doctrine of merger, see UTC Sec. 402(a)(5).

entering into binding nonjudicial settlement agreements
with trust beneficiaries, shortening the statute of limitations on trust contests and surcharge actions,49 limiting
objections to terminating distributions,"o and obtaining
beneficiary consents, releases, and ratifications."
Because of this increased exposure, trustees
should consider whether it is appropriate to serve as
trustee under an agreement that restricts the trustee's
ability to disclose information to trust beneficiaries,
and where accepting an appointment, whether the
additional risk should be reflected in the fiduciary fee.
The specific information that must or should be
disclosed to beneficiaries will vary depending on the
terms of the governing instrument and the grantor's
intent, state law, beneficiary factors, the trust assets
and economic conditions, and other factors. The timing of disclosure may be imposed by state law, or may
be driven by the trustee's desire to take advantage of
tools under the UTC. Absent these, prudence dictates
that the trustee send disclosure to the beneficiaries no
less frequently than annually, and also at the termination of the trust and the end of the trusteeship. More
frequent disclosures may be preferable for various reasons, including beneficiary relations reasons. In addition, the trustee must monitor the trust and the beneficiaries for events that may modify the trustee's duties
or give rise to new duties or new notice recipients,

50

UTC § 1005.
UTC § 817.

such as the death of the grantor or the grantor's
spouse, the birth or death of beneficiaries, changes in
institutional rates for fiduciary compensation, and significant law changes.
The evolution of the law concerning the trustee's
duty to disclose information to the trust beneficiaries,
through cases like Longmeyer for example, creates
new risks for trustees who are unaware of their obligations, and also opportunities for trustees to use disclosure to manage their risk. Trustees must review governing instruments and applicable law carefully to
understand and comply with their obligations, and
seek the advice of counsel as appropriate.
Trustees will also face an increasing number of difficult situations as in Longmeyer as a result of the trends
of increased elder financial abuse and abuses of powers
of attorney. While it can be a difficult decision to make
under pressure, trustees should give strong consideration
to policies that favor prompt and complete disclosure
even in difficult circumstances. Also, trustees should
remember that the courts are available for their protection where confronted with genuine doubt and difficulty
in the administration of the trust. Where a trust is significantly amended under questionable circumstances, it is
hard to imagine any court finding fault in a trustee that
seeks clarification and confirmation from the court
through a suit for aid and direction.

5 UTC § 1009.
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